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a b s t r a c t
This paper reconsiders the relation between oligopoly and perfect competition, more
specifically the problemof emergent instabilitywhen the number of competitors increases,
as pointed out by several authors. A process of mixed short and long run dynamics is set
up. In the short run the competitors are subject to capacity limits due to fixed capital
stocks, in the long run theymay renew these stocks and so in themoments of reinvestment
have access to a constant returns technology. The evolution of the system depends on the
number of competitors, the interval between their entry on the market, and the durability
of capital. The main result is a theorem showing that if capital has a durability of more
periods than the spacing of reinvestment times among the firms,multipliedwith their total
number, then the system always contracts to the Cournot equilibrium state.
© 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Economic theory considers different market forms, depending on the number of competing firms (suppliers), from
monopoly (one firm), over duopoly (two firms), oligopoly (a few firms), to perfect competition (a large number of firms). The
consumers (demanders), on the other hand, are always supposed to be very numerous. This means that only the suppliers,
in case they are few, can take strategic decisions. In the competitive case, suppliers are assumed to take price as fixed
(unalterable by their own actions) at the equilibrium of supply and demand. A monopolist, on the other hand, knowing the
demand function, i.e., the dependence of demand on price, can limit its supply in order to maximize profit, through setting
a monopoly price. The case of few competitors is even more complicated, because, in addition to demand, the suppliers can
also take the reactions of their competitors concerning their supply in account. The simplest setup is when each competitor
observes the actual supplies of the other competitors, and assumes these to be repeated the following time period, designing
its ownmove accordingly. In this way the supply of each firm becomes a function of past supplies of all the others, resulting
in what are called the reaction functions. This map, of dimension equal to the number of competing firms, can have one or
several fixed points, called Cournot equilibria. These equilibria can, of course, be stable or unstable. This model was stated
and analyzed in 1838 already by Augustin Cournot [1].
For coherence of the theory it would be desirable if an increasing number of competitors makes the Cournot equilibrium
become a perfect competition equilibrium. For this scenario one serious problem has arisen, as pointed out by Palander [2],
Theocharis [3], Ahmed [4] and Agiza [5]. The problem was that the Cournot equilibrium was destabilizedwhen the number
of competitors exceeded a very small number. Even if the Cournot equilibrium price approached the perfect competition
price, this equilibrium would lack interest if it is unstable.
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These studies have considered (i) some given number of competitors, and (ii) assumed production under constant returns.
A firm producing under constant returns faces constant marginal costs, which means that, at any price exceeding this
constant marginal cost, it can increase its profits without limit through increasing its scale of operation. Such a firm is
potentially infinitely large. Now, destabilization of a market through adding new firms of infinite size is, neither very
surprising, nor quite relevant, for the issue of whether a Cournot oligopoly while keeping stability would transform into a
perfect competition equilibrium or not. One should rather compare cases with few large firms to cases withmany small firms.
This is impossible to model assuming constant returns; one should have eventually decreasing returns, i.e., constraining the
possibility to bring up production only at progressively increasing costs (see [6]).
The easiest way to model this would be to use capacity limits as suggested by [7]. In some recent publications one of the
present authors showed how this can be achieved using the so-called CES production functions with one production factor
(capital) fixed through an act of investment. (See [8]).
Further, one should not just compare the cases, but explicitly devise a dynamical process through which new competitors are
added to themarket. A way to do this was proposed in [9], where also the firms were supposed to choose new capital stocks,
i.e., capacities at the ends of the investment periods when the capital stocks were worn out. As a rule, each new choice
of capital stock would be different from the previous, due to changed market conditions. In this way a mixed short/long
run dynamical process was set up. The short run process, where returns were decreasing due to fixed capacity limits, was
stable. At the moments of investment/reinvestment this was interspersed with instability elements, because when capital
was renewed the option of the firm was a constant returns technology.
The resulting scenerywas dominated by three factors: the eventual number of firms on themarket, the intervals between
their capital renewals, and the length of the investment periods. The model was further studied in [10]. Numerical evidence
indicated that a sufficiently long investment period would result in lasting stability of the Cournot equilibrium point when
the number of competitors increased.
The objective of the present paper is to study these issues in more mathematical detail.
2. Assumptions
2.1. Demand and revenue
Denoting total market demand, equal to supply in equilibrium Q , and price p, we assume the following relation to hold
pQ = 1. (1)
Such an ‘‘isoelastic’’ demand function results whenever the consumersmaximize utility functions of the Cobb–Douglas type.
Any consumer then spends a fixed fraction of income on each commodity, which means reciprocity of quantity to price.
Obviously this also holds for the sum of all individual demands on the market. The right-hand side constant represents the
total value that all consumers together spend on the particular commoditywhosemarket is studied. Choosing an appropriate
price or quantity unit, the constant can always be normalized to unity.1
The form (1)wasusedbyoneof thepresent authors in [11] and innumerous rejoinders by various authors (for instance [4]
and [5]) to discuss complex oligopoly dynamics.
Total market supply (equal to demand) from the n different firms of the industry
Q =
i=n∑
i=1
qi, (2)
substituted in (1) results in
p = 1
i=n∑
i=1
qi
. (3)
Defining ‘‘residual demand’’
Qi = Q − qi (4)
gives another useful form of the demand function:
p = 1
Qi + qi , (5)
where Qi is exogenous, and, unlike qi, cannot be controlled by the ith firm itself.
From (5), total revenue pqi of the ith firm equals:
Ri = qiQi + qi . (6)
1 Another popular shape of the demand function is the linear Q = a− bp, but it has the disadvantage that it does not result from any well posed utility
maximization problem, and further that it must be constrained to p ≤ a/b, in order to prevent demand from becoming negative.
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2.2. Production and cost functions
Assume the competitors produce using a technology represented by CES (constant elasticity of substitution) functions,
as written in standard form (see, for instance, Arrow et al. [12])
q−ρi = A
(
δk−ρi + (1− δ) l−ρi
)
,
where ρ, A and δ are some positive constants. Again the quantity units in which we measure outputs and inputs (capital ki
and labour li) are arbitrary, so through a trivial linear change of coordinates we reduce the CES function to the symmetric
form
q−ρi = k−ρi + l−ρi , (7)
where we got rid of the additional constants A and δ.
In what follows, we assume ρ > 0. In most uses of the CES function, ρ < 0, more precisely −1 < ρ < 0, is assumed,
with the isoquants meeting the axes at tangency. (For the physicist or geometrician these are just trivial cases of Minkowski
metrics.) For ρ < −1, the convexity does not make economic sense.
Arrow et al. also briefly discuss the case ρ > 0. They claim that the isoquants then go asymptotically to the axes, which
is incorrect. This only holds for the Cobb–Douglas function, which is normally included among the CES family, though (7)
makes no sense for ρ = 0. The asymptotes for ρ > 0 are located at some distance from the axes, at k = q and l = q, in the
positive quadrant. A correct description of this can be found in [13]. Exactly these asymptotes can be used as capacity limits.
We only need to revive the ‘‘putty/clay’’ ideas from growth theory of the 70s. See [14]. Though, presently we do not
assume both capital stock and manpower to be fixed, just the first through some act of investment.
Given we assume ρ > 0, we can specify any positive value, and in the topological sense all cases with positive exponents
will be equivalent to this. We therefore choose ρ = 1, which simplifies things a lot. This time we cannot claim that the
transformation kρi , l
ρ
i 7→ ki, li does not restrict the generality of the model, but, as long as we are interested in qualitative
features, rather than numerical exactness, the transformation is fine.
Given this, the CES production function can be written
qi = kiliki + li . (8)
The production costs for the ith firm are
Ci = rki + wli, (9)
where r andw denote capital rent and wage rate.
Now, solve (8) for labour li = kiqi/(ki − qi), assuming capital stock ki is given, and then substitute in (9), obtaining
Ci = rki + w kiqiki − qi , (10)
which is the short run cost function. In the short run, capital stock is taken as given through some act of investment. Of
course, capital wears out with time, and then has to be renewed if production is to be continued, presumably at a quantity
different from the previous. Meanwhile the fixed capital stock puts a capacity limit on production, because limqi→ki Ci = ∞.
Of course, the capital stocks/capacity limits can be different for the different firms of the industry.
There is also a long run cost function, where capital is optimally chosen to suit the planned production volume. To find
this take the derivative of (10) with respect to ki and equate to zero,
dCi
dki
= r − w q
2
i
(ki − qi)2
= 0.
Solving, the simple relation
ki =
(
1+
√
w
r
)
qi (11)
is obtained. Hence, at each expected production volume, the optimal capital stock is proportional to this expected volume.
Substituting the solution (11) back in (10), we get the long run cost function
C∗i =
(√
r +√w)2 qi, (12)
which is linear. The derivation shows that (12), the long run cost function, has an envelope property to the short run cost
functions (10).
In order to simplify, we assume that capital rent and wage rate are equal, i.e.,2
r = w = c.
2 The more general case with r 6= c is discussed in [10].
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Provided this, (11) becomes
ki = 2qi,
and the cost functions (10) and (12) simplify to
Ci = c k
2
i
ki − qi (13)
and
C∗i = 4cqi (14)
respectively.
2.3. Reaction functions
Each of the oligopolists maximizes profits, revenue minus cost. From (6) and (13), short run profits are
Πi = Ri − Ci = qiQi + qi − c
k2i
ki − qi , (15)
from (6) and (14), long run profits are
Π∗i = Ri − C∗i =
qi
Qi + qi − 4cqi. (16)
The ith firm chooses its output qi so as to maximize profits, according to (15) or (16), depending on perspective.
2.3.1. Short run
Putting the derivative of (15) with respect to qi equal to zero,
Qi
(Qi + qi)2
= c k
2
i
(ki − qi)2
(17)
is obtained. Note that all parameters and variables are nonnegative, and that output cannot exceed capacity, i.e., qi ≤ ki.
Hence we can take the square root of both sides, and solve the resulting linear equation for qi, thus obtaining
qi = ki
√
Qi
c − Qi
ki +
√
Qi
c
. (18)
This is normally called the reaction function, as it says how the ith firm responds with qi to each value of the residual supply
Qi from the competitors. To be precise, the latter is the expected value for the coming time period. The easiest way to set up
an iterative process is to assume this expected value to be equal to the actual observed value from the past period, which is
sometimes called naive expectations as they seldom turn out to be fulfilled. Hence, dating the variables, we obtain qi(t + 1)
as a function of Qi (t).3
Before accepting (18), we have in mind that it returns a negative output whenever
Qi ≤ 1c (19)
is not fulfilled. Such cases make no sense in terms of economics, so we assume that whenever (19) does not hold, then the
firm closes down.4 The resulting map is
qi (t + 1) =

ki
√
Qi(t)
c − Qi (t)
ki +
√
Qi(t)
c
, Qi (t) ≤ 1c
0, Qi (t) >
1
c
.
(20)
Before proceeding, it is useful for later considerations of stability to evaluate the derivative of the reaction function
∂qi
∂Qi
= −ki
(Qi − ki)
√
Qi
c + 2kiQi
2Qi
(
ki +
√
Qi
c
)2 . (21)
3 Note that (18) for i = 1, . . . , n along with (2) and (4) could be taken as an algebraic system of equations. The solution provides the coordinates of the
Cournot equilibrium point, though with (18) it is too messy to be solved in closed form.
4 In numerical work we may sometimes want to substitute the zero production at closing down by some very small positive quantity ε, because the
origin of phase space is an equilibrium (fixed point) of the system. It is totally unstable, yet the computer may stick to it.
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Like the Cournot equilibrium coordinates based on the short run reaction functions, this expression is too messy to
discuss, but we will find it useful for considering short run stability of the long run Cournot equilibrium.
2.3.2. Long run
Similarly, we can derive the reaction functions in the long run. Taking the derivative of (15) with respect to qi, and
equating to zero, we get
Qi
(Qi + qi)2
= 4c, (22)
which solves for
qi = 12
√
Qi
c
− Qi. (23)
Again, in order to arrive at a map, we have to consider that if
Qi ≤ 14c (24)
is not fulfilled, then (23) returns a negative value.5 The long run map is hence
qi (t + 1) =

1
2
√
Qi (t)
c
− Qi, Qi (t) ≤ 14c
0, Qi (t) >
1
4c
.
(25)
Let us also record the derivative of (23) for further use
∂qi
∂Qi
= 1
4
1√
cQi
− 1. (26)
2.4. Cournot equilibrium
It was mentioned above that Eq. (19) was too messy to discuss for the short run Cournot equilibrium. This is not the case
with (22). As the firms are distinct only in terms of different capital stocks, the long run equilibrium implies identical firms.
Then qi = 1/n · Q and Qi = (n− 1)/n · Q . From (19) then
n− 1
n
Q
Q 2
= 4c,
which solves for6
Q = n− 1
n
1
4c
. (27)
From qi = 1/n · Q ,
qi = 1n
n− 1
n
1
4c
, (28)
and, from Qi = (n− 1)/n · Q ,7
Qi =
(
n− 1
n
)2 1
4c
. (29)
5 The constraint (24) is much more restrictive than (19). This makes perfect sense. In the short run the firm has to pay capital costs for existent capital
anyhow, and will remain in business even at some loss, provided revenues help to cover a portion of fixed costs. In the long run the firm may choose its
capital stock and will require a positive profit in order to stay active.
6 Considering (27), and using (5), we have
n− 1
n
p = 4c.
As 4c is long run marginal cost, this gives a relation between price and marginal cost. Note that (n− 1)/n increases with n, from 1/2 for duopoly to 1 for
infinitely many competitors, so in the latter case there is perfect competition pricing.
7 Observe that (28) results in zero output when n = 1, which is the case of monopoly. The reason is that, given the assumed demand function, revenue
for the industry, in the case of monopoly the revenue of the monopolistic firm is always constant. As any reasonable cost function would increase with
output, the monopolist’s best choice would be to produce nothing, and to sell this nothing at an infinite price. Hence, the demand function is not suitable
for discussing monopoly.
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Further, using ki = 2qi,
ki = 1n
n− 1
n
1
2c
. (30)
2.5. Stability
As we will see, given certain conditions, the system considered has a tendency to contract to the long run Cournot
equilibrium state. As a preliminary we therefore consider the stability of this equilibrium with identical firms as described
by (27)–(30). This stability can be considered in the short and in the long run.
2.5.1. Short run
For short run stability, substitute (27)–(30) in (21) to obtain
∂qi
∂Qi
= −1
2
n− 2
(n+ 1) (n− 1) . (31)
This constant derivative enters all the off diagonal elements of the n by n Jacobian of the system, whereas the diagonal
elements are zero. Hence,
J =

0 −1
2
n− 2
(n+ 1) (n− 1) · · · −
1
2
n− 2(√
r
w
n+ 1
)
(n− 1)
−1
2
n− 2(√
r
w
n+ 1
)
(n− 1)
0 · · · −1
2
n− 2
(n+ 1) (n− 1)
...
...
. . .
...
−1
2
n− 2
(n+ 1) (n− 1) −
1
2
n− 2
(n+ 1) (n− 1) · · · 0

, (32)
whence the eigenvalues
λ1,...,n−1 = 12
n− 2
(n+ 1) (n− 1) , λn = −
1
2
n− 2
(n+ 1) . (33)
Accordingly, all
∣∣λ1,...,n∣∣ < 1, so the Cournot equilibrium is stable in the short run adjustment process.8
2.5.2. Long run
For checking long run stability substitute (27)–(30) in (21), to obtain
∂qi
∂Qi
= −1
2
n− 2
n− 1 .
The Jacobian is now
J∗ =

0 −1
2
n− 2
n− 1 · · · −
1
2
n− 2
n− 1
−1
2
n− 2
n− 1 0 · · · −
1
2
n− 2
n− 1
...
...
. . .
...
−1
2
n− 2
n− 1 −
1
2
n− 2
n− 1 · · · 0

,
with the eigenvalues
λ∗1,...n−1 =
1
2
n− 2
n− 1 , λ
∗
n = −
1
2
(n− 2) . (34)
The multiple eigenvalue never causes any problems, but λ∗n does. Quite as noted by [5,4], the Cournot equilibrium is
destabilized if n > 4.
By conclusion, the Cournot equilibrium is stable in the short run, but unstable in the long run whenever n > 4.
8 If r 6= w things become more complicated as shown in [10]. Then short run stability holds for all numbers n of competitors only ifw < 4r. If not, one
can always find a system with sufficiently many competitors where the Cournot equilibrium is unstable in the short run.
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2.6. The process studied
Inwhat followswewill study the evolution and stability of amixed short and long run process, where themain adjustment
is made through the short run process, which is periodically interrupted by the long run process for those time values when
some firms replace worn out capital.
2.6.1. Capital renewal
Assume that capital stock has a durability of T periods, and then suffers sudden death, meanwhile yielding constant rates
of service.9
Further, assume the n potential firms, that all initially produce nothing (initially having zero capital stocks), enter at
regular intervals of m periods. After their first entry, the firms will reinvest when capital stock wears out (after T periods).
As a rule they then, due to changed market conditions, choose capital stocks different from what they had before.
To see if a firm is investing or not, we check the simple variable
t −mi mod T , (35)
where t is the current time period, m the time difference in entry (reinvestment), i the number of the firm, and T the
durability of capital.
When (35) is zero, then firm i invests in period t , otherwise not. The periods when a certain firm invests we have
ki (t + 1) = 2qi (t + 1), so, using (23),
ki (t + 1) =
√
Qi (t)
c
− 2Qi (t) , (36)
otherwise just
ki (t + 1) = ki (t) . (37)
2.6.2. The iterative map
Collecting results from (20) and (25), and using the assumptions on reinvestment (36) and (37), we arrive at the final
map
qi (t + 1) =

ki (t)
√
Qi(t)
c − Qi (t)
ki (t)+
√
Qi(t)
c
, t −mi mod T 6= 0 ∧ Qi (t) ≤ 1c
0, t −mi mod T 6= 0 ∧ Qi (t) > 1c
1
2
√
Qi (t)
c
− Qi (t) , t −mi mod T = 0 ∧ Qi (t) ≤ 14c
0, t −mi mod T = 0 ∧ Qi (t) > 14c
(38)
Qi (t + 1) =
j=n∑
j=1
qj (t + 1)− qi (t + 1) (39)
ki (t + 1) =

ki (t) , t −mi mod T 6= 0√
Qi (t)
c
− 2Qi, t −mi mod T 6= 0 ∧ Qi ≤ 14c
0, t −mi mod T 6= 0 ∧ Qi > 14c .
(40)
This is the map we run, using initially all qi (0) = 0, and all ki (0) = 0.
2.7. Cournot equilibrium in a mixed process
Let us consider a fixed point (q∗, k∗) = (q∗1, q∗2, . . . , q∗n, k∗1, k∗2, . . . , k∗n) of the map F given by formulas (38)–(40). We
assume that this point is a Cournot equilibrium defined by (28), (30).
9 We could have used other depreciation assumptions, but our choice is the simplest.
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To find the stability conditions for (q∗, k∗)we need to calculate Lyapunov exponents which are found as
λ(q(0), k(0), v) = lim
t→∞
1
t
ln ‖DF(q(t), k(t), t)v‖,
where (q(0), k(0)) is some initial point, {(q(t), k(t))}t=∞t=0 is a generated trajectory and v is a directional vector.
Due to peculiarities of the iterative map F , its Jacobi matrix depends on time t even if the considered solution is a fixed
point. Really, if t −mi mod T 6= 0, i = 1, . . . , n, the matrix has the form
DF(q∗, k∗, t) df= J =

0 a . . . a d 0 . . . 0
a 0 . . . a 0 d . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a a . . . 0 0 0 . . . d
0 0 . . . 0 1 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0 0 1 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 1

,
where
a = −1
2
n− 2
(n+ 1)(n− 1) ,
d = n
2(n+ 1) .
(41)
However, if there exists 1 ≤ i0 ≤ n such that t −mi0 mod T = 0, then the coordinate qi0 makes a jump (switches from the
short run map to the long run one), and so the Jacobi matrix changes:
DF(q∗, k∗, t) df= Ji0 =

0 a . . .
i0
a a . . . a d 0 . . .
i0+n
0 . . . 0
a 0 . . . a a . . . a 0 d . . . 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b b . . . 0 b . . . b 0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a a . . . a a . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0 . . . d
0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 1 0 . . . 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0 1 . . . 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2b 2b . . . 0 2b . . . 2b 0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0 . . . 1

i0
i0+n
,
where a and d are given by (41) and
b = −1
2
n− 2
n− 1 (= (n+ 1)a). (42)
If several coordinates make a jump at the same time (say, qi0 and qj0 ), then several corresponding rows change:
DF(q∗, k∗, t) df= Ji0j0 =

0 a . . .
i0
a . . .
j0
a . . . a d 0 . . .
i0+n
0 . . .
j0+n
0 . . . 0
a 0 . . . a . . . a . . . a 0 d . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b b . . . 0 . . . b . . . b 0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b b . . . b . . . 0 . . . b 0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a a . . . a . . . a . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . d
0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 1 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 0 1 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2b 2b . . . 0 . . . 2b . . . 2b 0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2b 2b . . . 2b . . . 0 . . . 2b 0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 1

i0
j0
i0+n
j0+n
,
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Obviously, for each coordinate qi, the jump appears with period T , therefore Lyapunov exponents of the fixed point
(q∗, k∗) are defined by T consequent iterations (starting from any time moment t):
λ(q∗, k∗, v) = 1
T
ln ‖Jˆv‖,
where
Jˆ = DF(q∗, k∗, t + T − 1) · DF(q∗, k∗, t + T − 2) · . . . · DF(q∗, k∗, t).
This implies that
λi(q∗, k∗) = ln |νi(q∗, k∗)|1/T , i = 1, . . . , 2n,
where {νi(q∗, k∗)}i=2ni=1 are the eigenvalues of the matrix Jˆ. Thus, we claim that for the stability of the fixed point (q∗, k∗) it is
enough to check that maxi=1,2n |νi(q∗, k∗)| < 1. Let us omit, for brevity, (q∗, k∗) in the notation for the eigenvalues writing
simply {νi}i=2ni=1 .
2.7.1. Case T ≥ mn
In this case, at each time t not more than one qi makes a jump, therefore the desired matrix has a form
Jˆ = JT−mn · Jn · Jm−1 · Jn−1 · Jm−1 · . . . · J1 · Jm−1.
The matrices Ji · Jm−1 have the same sets of eigenvalues, and the maximal absolute value equals 1. However, the sets of
eigenvectors do not coincide, and we cannot represent the eigenvalues {νi}i=2ni=1 of Jˆ as Ji · Jm−1 eigenvalues products.
However, there is an intuitive feeling that maxi=1,2n |νi| ≤ 1, which means that in the case T ≥ mn the fixed point
(q∗, k∗) is always stable. (If maxi=1,2n |νi| = 1 the trajectory still converges to the fixed point, however, not exponentially,
but linearly).
Let us introduce the notation for any square s× smatrix A
ρ(A) = max
i=1,s
|νi(A)|,
where {νi(A)}i=si=1 denote the eigenvalues of A. The value ρ(A) is called a spectral radius of the matrix. It is known that the
spectral radius is the exact lower bound for all matrix norm values, i.e.
ρ(A) = inf{‖A‖ | ‖.‖ is a matrix norm},
which means
(1) for any matrix norm ‖.‖ it is true that ‖A‖ ≥ ρ(A),
(2) for any ε > 0 there exists a matrix norm ‖.‖ such that
ρ(A) ≤ ‖A‖ ≤ ρ(A)+ ε. (43)
Now we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let A1 and A2 be two s× s matrices such that ρ(Ai) = 1, i = 1, 2. Then for the matrix A = A1A2 holds
ρ(A) ≤ 1.
Proof. From (43) we have that for any ε > 0 there exists a matrix norm ‖.‖ such that
1 ≤ ‖Ai‖ ≤ 1+ ε, i = 1, 2.
This implies
‖A‖ ≤ ‖A1‖ · ‖A2‖ ≤ (1+ ε)2 = 1+ 2ε + ε2 df= 1+ ε˜.
As ε is arbitrary, we can claim that for any ε˜ > 0 there exists a matrix norm ‖.‖ such that ‖A‖ ≤ 1+ ε˜, which means that
ρ(A) = inf‖.‖{‖A‖} ≤ 1.
This completes the proof. 
Thus, due to Lemma 1, ρ(Jˆ) = max |νi| ≤ 1.
In Fig. 1 we plot transients for different values of m, n, T . In all the cases plotted trajectories stabilize at the Cournot
equilibrium. However, the time of stabilization increases for larger values of n.
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Fig. 1. Case T ≥ mn. First two figures represent relatively small T = 80. The last two figures show the situation for large T = 500.
2.7.2. Case T = 2
In this situation, regardless ofm, at each moment t there are several coordinates that make a jump, namely, odd an even
alternatingly. Let us consider separately odd and even n.
Case n = 2s. The fixed point (q∗, k∗) stability matrix is of the form Jˆ = Beven · Bodd, where
Bodd =

0 b b b . . . b 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
a 0 a a . . . a 0 d 0 0 . . . 0
b b 0 b . . . b 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
a a a 0 . . . a 0 0 0 d . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a a a a . . . 0 0 0 0 0 . . . d
0 2b 2b 2b . . . 2b 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 1 0 0 . . . 0
2b 2b 0 2b . . . 2b 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 1 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 1

and
Beven =

0 a a a . . . a d 0 0 0 . . . 0
b 0 b b . . . b 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
a a 0 a . . . a 0 0 d 0 . . . 0
b b b 0 . . . b 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b b b b . . . 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 1 0 0 0 . . . 0
2b 0 2b 2b . . . 2b 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 1 0 . . . 0
2b 2b 2b 0 . . . 2b 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2b 2b 2b 2b . . . 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0

.
Here a, d, and b are given by formulas (41) and (42), correspondingly.
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Let us find the eigenvalues of the matrix Jˆ explicitly. First, it is easy to show that there will be ν1 = ν2 = · · · = νn = 0
and νn+1 = · · · = ν2n−2 = b(a− 2d). To find the last two eigenvalues we use the fact that
i=2n∑
i=1
νi = tr Jˆ,
i=2n∑
i=1
j=2n∑
j=i+1
νiνj =
i=2n∑
i=1
j=2n∑
j=i+1
Jˆ
(
i j
i j
)
,
(44)
where Jˆ
(
i j
i j
)
are the main second order minors of Jˆ, namely, in notation Jˆ = {Jˆij}i,j=2ni,j=1 ,
Jˆ
(
i j
i j
)
= det
(
Jˆii Jˆij
Jˆji Jˆjj
)
.
Solving the system (44) for ν2n−1, ν2n we get that
ν2n−1,2n = x±√y,
where
x = (s− 1)
2(2s4 − 4s3 − 2s2 + 2s+ 1)
(2s− 1)2(2s+ 1)2
y = 4s
2(s− 1)4(s6 − 4s5 − 14s4 − 10s3 + 2s2 + 4s+ 1)
(2s− 1)4(2s+ 1)4 .
Finally, solving the system of inequalities
max{|b(a− 2d)|, |x±√y|} < 1 (45)
for s, we obtain that
max
i=1,2n
|νi| < 1 for s = 1, 2, 3 (n = 2, 4, 6).
For the larger values of even n Cournot equilibrium loses its stability.
Case n = 2s + 1. This case has much in common with the previous one, however the matrices Bodd and Beven have two
additional rows each:
Bodd =

0 b b b . . . b b 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
a 0 a a . . . a a 0 d 0 0 . . . 0 0
b b 0 b . . . b b 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
a a a 0 . . . a a 0 0 0 d . . . 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a a a a . . . 0 a 0 0 0 0 . . . d 0
b b b b . . . b 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
0 2b 2b 2b . . . 2b 2b 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 1 0 0 . . . 0 0
2b 2b 0 2b . . . 2b 2b 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0 1 . . . 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 1 0
2b 2b 2b 2b . . . 2b 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0

and
Beven =

0 a a a . . . a a d 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
b 0 b b . . . b b 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
a a 0 a . . . a a 0 0 d 0 . . . 0 0
b b b 0 . . . b b 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b b b b . . . 0 b 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
a a a a . . . a 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 d
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 1 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
2b 0 2b 2b . . . 2b 2b 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 1 0 . . . 0 0
2b 2b 2b 0 . . . 2b 2b 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2b 2b 2b 2b . . . 0 2b 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 1

.
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Fig. 2. Case T = 2. First two figures represent n = 5, 6 when Cournot equilibrium is stable. At the last two figures for n = 7, 8 attractors are of more
complicated form.
Likewise in the case 2.7.2 eigenvalues of the matrix Jˆ are
ν1 = ν2 = · · · = νn = 0,
νn+1 = · · · = ν2n−2 = b(a− 2d),
ν2n−1,2n = x±√y,
where
x = (2s− 1)(8s
4 − 12s3 − 10s2 + 11s− 2)
128s2(s+ 1)
y = (2s− 1)
2(64s8 − 192s7 − 1040s6)
1282s4(s+ 1)2 +
(2s− 1)2(−608s5 + 828s4 + 596s3 − 31s2 − 44s+ 4)
1282s4(s+ 1)2 .
Solving again the system (45), we get
max
i=1,2n
|νi| < 1 for s = 1, 2 (n = 3, 5).
Fig. 2 corroborates the desired theoretical results.
3. Conclusions
To sum up, we can say that the fixed point (q∗, k∗) lying in the full synchronization manifold (Cournot equilibrium) can
be stable even for the systems with large numbers of elements n. Its stability depends much on the relationship between T ,
m and n. However, the results obtained are only a minor part of what can be investigated in the system under consideration.
There are still plenty of unsolvedproblems.Next steps could be studying of clustered periodic solutions and, possibly, strange
non-chaotic attractors. Existence of the last ones should be also proved first.
In terms of economics themajor result in this paper was the conclusion that Cournot equilibrium is stable when T = mn,
i.e., when the durability of capital is sufficiently long. If so, the addition of new competitors always stabilizes the system
at long run Cournot equilibrium. A problem with applying this (sufficient) condition, might seem to be that if the number
of competitors goes to infinity, as sometimes implied in discussing perfect competition, then so should the length of the
investment period.
However, an infinite number of competitors is absurd both theoretically and empirically. If one really wants to model
an evolving process to perfect competition, one should rather think in terms of a large but finite number of competitors.
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Otherwise, given any fixed period system, even if we did outm = 1, the process of establishment of new competitors would
be never ending.
Asmentioned above, there remainmany scenarios to investigatewithin the simplifiedmodel as it stands, it would further
be of interest to investigate caseswhere the firmsmight enter at irregular intervals, and have different durabilities of capital,
maybe even changing over time.
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